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the timely payments of principal and interest on
these MBS and collect a guarantee fee in return;
this is effectively insurance business. The interest
rate risk of these MBS resides with the investors
that purchase these securities. Second, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac purchase mortgage-related secu-
rities, including their own MBS, and retain these
securities; these purchases are mostly financed
with debt securities. In this line of business, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac take on interest rate risk and,
unless these assets are securities issued by Ginnie
Mae (Government National Mortgage Association),
credit risk.1 Because the mortgage portfolios of
these enterprises are geographically diversified
and because, by definition, mortgage loans are
collateralized debt, the credit risk is generally held
to be small (see the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight [OFHEO], 2003).2
T
his article examines the sensitivity to
realizations of interest rate risk of the
stock returns of Fannie Mae (Federal
National Mortgage Association) and
Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation). The study shows that the market
value of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s equity is
vulnerable to increases in short-term interest rates
and changes in the term spread (the difference
between the long-term and short-term interest
rates).
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are venues for
pursuing the public policy objective of furthering
home ownership by improving the availability of
mortgage financing for medium- and low-income
households. These enterprises are organized as
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), that is,
they are privately operated and funded corpora-
tions that are chartered by the federal government.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are competi-
tors, pursue two major lines of business. First,
these enterprises purchase mortgage loans, bundle
them into mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and
sell them to investors. The enterprises guarantee
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) with the stated objective
of promoting home ownership by improving the availability of mortgage financing for private house-
holds. These enterprises engage in two separate and distinct lines of business: (i) assembling and
marketing pools of mortgages on which they guarantee the timely payments of principal and interest
and (ii) purchasing mortgage assets for their own portfolio, mostly funded with debt securities. This
article examines the sensitivity of the returns on GSEs’ equity shares to realizations of interest rate
risk. The study shows that the market value of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s equity is vulnerable
to increases in short-term interest rates and changes in the term spread (the difference between the
long-term and short-term interest rates).
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1 Securities issued by Ginnie Mae are backed by the full faith and
credit of the U.S. government.
2 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may raise the credit risk of the retained
mortgage portfolios by raising the loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of the
mortgages they purchase; for mortgages with an LTV greater than
80 percent, these GSEs have to demand credit enhancement (see
OFHEO, 2003).
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 Recent controversies surrounding Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac have concerned the efficacy of
subsidizing home ownership through the channel
of GSEs and the incentive structure government
sponsorship creates at these entities; for an over-
view of these controversies, see Frame and Wall
(2002a) and Van Order (2000). On one hand,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are publicly traded
corporations. On the other hand, because these
enterprises operate with charters issued by the
federal government, they enjoy privileges not
available to other companies in the private sector.
There is concern that government sponsorship
generates extra income to the shareholders by
establishing a barrier to entry to the market, pre-
venting potential rivals from competing away
abnormal profits at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(see Hermalin and Jaffee, 1996). Abnormal profits
go to the shareholders, the investors that hold the
residual income rights. According to a study by
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2004),
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac retained about a
third of the subsidy that they gathered (see also
Passmore, 2003). On the other hand, as pointed
out by Frame and White (2004), this surplus is at
risk of being eroded through competition from
Federal Home Loan Banks and, due to improved
risk-based capital requirements laid out in the
Basel II regulatory standards, from commercial
banks.
In a corporation, the shareholders hold the
control rights over the allocation of the assets; this
is because bundling control and residual income
rights abets the internalization of the consequences
of decisionmaking. But these control rights also
put the shareholders in a position to behave oppor-
tunistically vis-à-vis the debt holders. Remember
that the equity of a corporation is a call option
on its assets (Merton, 1974). The shareholders may
exercise this call by making the promised pay-
ments to the debt holders; not exercising this call
would entail bankruptcy or, equivalently, the trans-
fer of the control rights over the assets to the debt
holders. All else being equal, the value of an
option increases with the volatility in the value of
the underlying asset; here, the underlying asset is
the enterprise’s asset portfolio. Put differently, the
riskier the firm, the more valuable is the equity;
this is why the shareholders have an incentive to
behave opportunistically vis-à-vis the debt holders
by taking on more risk than originally stated once
the debt holders are invested.3 The shareholders
can increase the risk of the firm by choosing an
asset portfolio with a greater dispersion of pay-
offs or by increasing its financial leverage. The
Modigliani-Miller theorem implies that financial
leverage has no bearing on the value of the firm.4
Remember that the value of the firm is the market
value of the assets, which equals the market value
of the financial (debt and equity) claims on these
assets. Hence, if the shareholders gain from
increased leverage, then the debt holders lose.
Anticipating the shareholders’ incentives, invest-
ors, before underwriting the firm’s debt, insist on
collateral or restrict through covenants the share-
holders’ choice set.
At Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, because of
government sponsorship, traditional constraints
on shareholder risk-taking do not apply. Generally,
when investors underwrite corporate debt, they are
buying default-free debt—effectively, government
debt—and write a put option to the shareholders,
giving the shareholders the right to walk away
from the firm; the right to walk away is the privi-
lege of limited liability (Merton, 1974). At Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, the debt holders do not
seem to perceive themselves as writers of put
options; in fact, it appears that the debt holders
assume that the government writes these options.
This perceived government guarantee explains
why the credit quality of Fannie Mae’s and
Freddie Mac’s debt is close to default-free. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC,
2004) states that “if investors were to disregard any
implicit guarantee...GSE credit ratings would
likely be lowered from the top ratings grades cur-
rently issued by major rating agencies. Based on
existing studies, we assume that the ratings agen-
cies would lower GSE credit ratings within a range
of AA to A.” 
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3 Here, risk is total risk, which comprises systematic risk and idio-
syncratic risk.
4 If debt is tax-preferred over equity, then financial leverage indeed
contributes to the value of the firm. On the other hand, there are
bankruptcy costs—the difference between the going-concern value
and the liquidation value of the assets accounts for much of these
costs. Bankruptcy costs limit the optimal amount of financial
leverage.The evidence of market discipline provided by
Seiler (2003) notwithstanding, there is reason to
believe that debt holders impose no effective con-
straint on risk-taking at Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac; see, for instance, OFHEO (2003) and FDIC
(2004).5 Further, the convexity of the enterprises’
excess stock returns in the excess market return,
as evidenced in Schmid (2004), suggests that there
is a conjectural guarantee for the shareholders as
well. The assumed option writer—the government
and, ultimately, the taxpayer—limits risk-taking at
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through a regulator,
the OFHEO.6
What follows is an empirical study of the
sensitivity of the stock returns of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to draws from interest rate risk dis-
tributions. The analyzed time period is May 1991
through December 2003; most of this time window
overlaps with the existence of the OFHEO, which
began operations in 1993. To be parsimonious, I
measure realizations of interest rate risk only in
two dimensions, which are changes in the level
and the slope (or term spread) of the Treasury
yield curve.
The next section offers a brief discussion of
retained interest rate risk or, synonymously, bal-
ance sheet risk at these enterprises. I then describe
the data and the variables employed in the empiri-
cal analysis, outline the econometric method, and
offer the empirical findings and conclusions. There
are two appendixes; one contains information on
the data sources and definitions of the variables
and another describes the econometric approach.
SOURCES OF INTEREST RATE
RISK AT FANNIE MAE AND
FREDDIE MAC
Jaffee (2003) offers a detailed analysis of the
interest rate risk that emanates from the debt-
financed retained mortgage portfolios of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. Jaffee distinguishes two
potential sources of interest rate risk. First, the
cash flow of the mortgage assets over time and
across interest rate environments may not match
with the cash flow of the debt liabilities. Such a
mismatch may arise when these GSEs finance their
retained mortgage portfolios with short-term debt.
Because short rates are lower than long rates most
of the time, the difference between the short bor-
rowing rate and the long lending rate is a source
of income, in particular when the term structure
of interest rates is strongly upward sloping. This
“carry trade” may cause a duration mismatch
between the mortgage portfolio and the debt lia-
bilities that finance this portfolio.7 If, for instance,
the weighted average of the times to maturity of
the cash flows of the assets is shorter than the
weighted average of the times to maturity of the
cash flows of the debt liabilities, then there is a
negative duration gap. In such a situation, the
liabilities are more sensitive to changes in interest
rates than are the assets: When interest rates
decline, the assets increase in value less than
the liabilities and, hence, the value of the equity
declines.
The second potential source of interest rate risk
may originate in a mismatch of the prepayment
options embedded in the mortgage portfolio and
the call options embedded in the debt liabilities
that finance this mortgage portfolio—this is the
prepayment risk. With their retained mortgage
portfolios, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have a
long position in collateralized debt and a short
position in call options on this debt; the house-
holds that take out these mortgage loans have a
long position in the calls. Writing call options is
a source of income: The premium of the call con-
tributes to the yield spread between (fixed-rate)
mortgages and debt securities of similar duration
and default risk. When long rates fall, for instance,
Schmid
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5 Seiler (2003) has shown that the share prices and senior-debt yield
spreads of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac indeed respond to news
concerning the enterprises’ financial risk and the probability of
the government guaranteeing the enterprises’ debt.
6 The OFHEO was established under the Federal Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992.
7 Duration, also known as Macaulay’s duration, is a weighted average
of the times to maturity of a portfolio’s scheduled cash flows. This
weighted average is an elasticity that indicates the percentage change
in the market value of this portfolio in response to a uniform, 1
percent change in the discount factor for all times to maturity,
multiplied by –1. The discount factor for a given cash flow equals
1 + rt, where rt is the interest rate for the remaining time to maturity
in question, t. The concept of duration assumes that the discount
factors (1 + rt) change by the same proportion for all t.then the value of the call options increases, which
subtracts from the market value of the mortgage
portfolio. The GSEs can hedge their short position
in calls by holding call options on their debt.
From these two sources of risk, Jaffee (2003)
derives the perfect balance sheet hedge. Interest
rate risk is perfectly hedged if the mortgage port-
folio is financed with long-term callable debt
such that the cash flow of the mortgage portfolio
matches the cash flow of the debt in any interest
rate environment, regardless of the amount of
mortgage loans that is being prepaid.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not pursue
a perfect balance sheet hedge, in part because
these enterprises regard risk-taking as a line of
business; as Jaffee (2003) has shown, risk-taking
is highly profitable for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Jaffee defines as balance sheet risk the frac-
tion of interest rate risk that these GSEs leave
unhedged. This author shows that the maturity gap
and the short position in call options are signifi-
cant sources of income at Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Jaffee also offers a detailed analysis of the
hedging strategies of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
It is ultimately an empirical question of how much
interest rate risk these GSEs retain and how much
they hedge.
DATA AND DEFINITIONS OF
VARIABLES
I study the sensitivity of the stock returns of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to (good or bad)
draws of interest rate risk, as perceived by the
marginal shareholder; I control for realizations
of market risk (or, synonymously, systematic risk);
market risk manifests itself in the covariance with
the market return of the stock return of the respec-
tive enterprise. I allow these stock-return sensitivi-
ties to be time-varying.
In keeping with standard practice, I study the
logarithmic excess return, that is, the logarithmic
return in excess of an investment in the risk-free
asset. I choose the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP®) value-weighted stock market index
as the market portfolio and a eurodollar money
market deposit as the risk-free asset. I measure
shifts in the level of the yield curve by changes
in the 3-month constant-maturity Treasury yield.
I gauge changes in the slope (term spread) of the
yield curve by changes in the difference between
the constant maturity 10-year and 3-month
Treasury yields. The variables are on a weekly
basis (Friday through Thursday), to avoid potential
autocorrelation of returns due to the weekend
effect.8 The observations run from Friday, May 31,
1991, through Thursday, December 18, 2003. The
time period starts when 7-day eurodollar rates
became available. For details on the definitions of
the variables and the data sources, see Appendix A.
Figure 1 offers a scatter diagram of pair-wise
observations of changes in the short rate and the
term spread. The scatter diagram shows that these
two variables are mildly negatively correlated;
the correlation coefficient equals –0.43.
EMPIRICAL METHOD AND
RESULTS
In analyzing the sensitivity of the stock returns
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to draws from the
market risk and interest rate risk distributions, I
start out with the nonparametric model
(1) ,
where yt denotes the observation of the dependent
variable at time t, the vector zt comprises the
observations of the explanatory variables at time
t, and εt is an independently and normally distrib-
uted error term with mean 0 and constant, finite
variance σ 2. The dependent variable is the 7-day
(Friday through Thursday) logarithmic excess
stock return of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, respec-
tively. The explanatory variables comprise the 7-
day logarithmic excess return of the market, the
change of the 3-month T-bill yield, the change of
the difference between the 10-year T-note and
the 3-month T-bill yields during this 7-day period,
and a time index. The time index measures the
distance of observation t to the first observation
yf tt t =+ () z ε
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8 Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) have documented that when Friday’s
stock return is negative, Monday’s return is negative nearly 80
percent of the time, with a mean return of –0.61 percent. Also, when
Friday’s return is positive, the subsequent Monday’s mean return
is positive, averaging 0.11 percent.
 in the studied time period, measured in number
of weeks elapsed, plus 1. The functional form f(•)
accommodates an intercept. For details on the
econometric method, see Appendix B.
I estimate model (1) using the multivariate
smoother LOESS (locally weighted regression) as
developed by Cleveland and Devlin (1988) and
Cleveland, Devlin, and Grosse (1988); for details
on the econometric method, see Appendix B.
Table 1 offers an analysis of variance for restric-
tions imposed on model (1) (for details on the cal-
culation of the test statistic, see Appendix B). The
first row (“Market”) shows that the excess stock
returns of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac covary in
a statistically significant manner with the market
excess return, as expected. Further, these excess
stock returns vary in a statistically significant
manner with changes in the short rate and the term
spread; these variables are statistically significant
individually and as a group (joint test). In conclu-
sion, I can reject the hypotheses that the stock
market perceives Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s
interest rate risks as perfectly hedged.
Table 1 also offers an analysis of variance for
the restriction that the influences on the GSEs’
excess returns of realizations of market risk (on
one hand) and interest rate risk (on the other hand)
are additive. Imposing such a restriction on model
(1) leads to the following generalized additive
model:
(2) .
In model (2), the component f1(•) captures the
influence of the log market excess return and the
component f2(•) subsumes the influences of the
changes in the short rate and the term spread; both
xt and z ˜t include the time index, and both com-
ponents f1(•) and f2(•) provide for an intercept.
The test statistic in Table 1 (“Generalized additive
model”) does not reject the hypothesis that the
influences of market risk and interest rate risk
are additive; in what follows, this restriction is
imposed.
yf xf ttt t =++ 12 () () % z ε
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Figure 1
Scatter Diagram of Interest Rate Risk RealizationsFigures 2 (Fannie Mae) and 3 (Freddie Mac)
offer quantitative estimates for the sensitivity of
the GSEs’ excess returns to draws from the interest
rate risk distributions as obtained from the com-
ponent f2(•) of the generalized additive model (2).
The estimates shown in these figures are presented
in conditioning plots, as introduced by Cleveland
and Devlin (1988). Such plots display the esti-
mated (partial) impact of a selected explanatory
variable with the other explanatory variables
pegged at chosen values. Because the intercept
is not identified in this type of regression, only
changes in the displayed partial impact (rather
than the level itself) can be interpreted in an econ-
omically meaningful manner. The variable that
varies in a given conditioning plot adopts only
values observed in the neighborhood of the pegged
explanatory variables. Specifically, when I peg a
variable to its median negative (positive) value,
only observations for which this variable adopts
nonpositive (nonnegative) values are included
in the conditioning plot. Similarly, when I peg a
variable (such as the changes in the short rate or
term spread) at zero, only observations for which
this variable lies within the closed interval of the
median negative and the median positive values
are included in the conditioning plot. A similar
principle applies to the time index. (For the time
index, substitute 25th percentile for median nega-
tive value, median for zero, and 75th percentile
for median positive value.) At the bottom of each
figure there is a frequency distribution for the
variable that varies along the horizontal axis.
The top rows of each panel (A through C) of
Figures 2 (Fannie Mae) and 3 (Freddie Mac) dis-
play, for three different values of changes in the
term spread, the influence of changes in the short
rate on the log excess stock returns. In the leftmost
plot of the top row, the change of the term spread
is pegged at the median negative value; in the
center plot, the change is zero; and in the rightmost
plot, this variable is kept at the median positive
value. The plots show that the log excess returns
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are negatively
related to changes in the short rate and that this
relation is convex. In Panel A, the time index is
pegged at its 25th percentile, which is early
October 1994; in Panels B and C, the time index
is pegged at its median (mid-February 1998) and
its 75th percentile (early July 2001), respectively.
Late in the studied time period (Panel C), assuming
that there is no change to the term spread, a drop
in the short rate by 26 basis points (or 0.0026)
boosts the excess return of Fannie Mae by 130
basis points; conversely, a rise in the short rate
by 30 basis points depresses this return by 231
basis points.9 For Freddie Mac, the respective
numbers read 105 and 215 basis points.
Schmid
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Table 1
Analysis of Variance
Fannie Mae DDF: 532 Freddie Mac DDF: 500
NDF F-statistic NDF F-statistic
Market 49 4.460* 65 3.579*
Short rate 46 2.848* 61 2.237*
Term spread 54 2.100* 71 1.801*
Time index 29 2.025* 40 1.996*
Short rate and term spread (joint test) 84 2.300* 113 1.884*
Nonconstant explanatory variables (joint test) 116 4.472* 161 3.352*
Generalized additive model 1 0.506 2 0.051
NOTE: *Indicates significance at the 1 percent level. DDF (NDF): Denominator (numerator) degrees of freedom. Number of observations:
615.
9 The scatter diagram of Figure 1 shows observations of a 26-basis-
point decrease and a 30-basis-point increase in the short rate that
come with no or only minute changes in the term spread.
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Figure 2
Interest Rate Sensitivity of Fannie Mae’s Stock Return
A. Early Period
B. Mid-Period
 The bottom rows of each panel (A through C)
of Figures 2 (Fannie Mae) and 3 (Freddie Mac)
display, for three different values of changes in
the short rate, the influence of changes in the term
spread on the log excess stock return. In the left-
most plot of the bottom row, the change of the
short rate is pegged at the median negative value;
in the center plot, this change is zero; and in the
rightmost plot, it is kept at the median positive
value. The plots show that the log excess returns
of Fannie Mae (late in the studied time period) and
Freddie Mac (for the entire studied time period)
are “hump-shaped” in changes in the term spread;
early in the analyzed time period, the excess return
of Fannie Mae is negatively related to changes in
the term spread. Late in the studied period (Panel
C), assuming no change in the short rate, a drop
in the term spread by 32 basis points (or 0.0032)
depresses the excess return of Fannie Mae by 158
basis points; correspondingly, a rise in the short
rate by 26 basis points depresses this return by
454 basis points.10 For Freddie Mac, the respec-
tive numbers read 189 and 263 basis points.
CONCLUSION
This article offers an empirical analysis of
the sensitivity of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s
excess stock returns to draws from interest rate
risk distributions. The empirical approach allows
this sensitivity to be nonlinear and to vary with
time, possibly in nonlinear ways. The analysis
shows little time variation in the sensitivity of
these GSEs’ stock returns to changes in the short-
term interest rate. This also holds for Freddie Mac’s
sensitivity to changes in the term spread. But
unlike Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae shows, over time,
Schmid
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Figure 2 (cont’d)
Interest Rate Sensitivity of Fannie Mae’s Stock Return
C. Late Period
10 The scatter diagram of Figure 1 shows observations of a 32-basis-
point decrease and a 26-basis-point increase in the short rate that
come with no or only minute changes in the term spread.
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Figure 3
Interest Rate Sensitivity of Freddie Mac’s Stock Return
A. Early Period
B. Mid-Period
 a marked change in its stock return sensitivity to
changes in the slope of the yield curve. Early in
the studied time period, Fannie Mae’s stock return
varied negatively with the term spread; later, this
sensitivity adopted the hump-shaped relation that
characterizes Freddie Mac’s stock return sensitivity
over the entire analyzed time period. Note that the
measured interest rate sensitivities are responses
above and beyond the variation of the stock return
with the market return; this market return itself
may be sensitive to interest rate risk. An analysis
of variance shows that these two influences—
realizations of market (systematic) risk (on one
hand) and interest rate risk (on the other hand)—
are additive.
It is ultimately a matter of judgment as to
whether the measured interest rate sensitivities
are considered large (enough to be concerned) or
small. Also, remember that the measured sensitivi-
ties are “as perceived by the marginal investor.”
Information in the public domain on Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac has varied over the studied
time period. Following six voluntary initiatives
announced in October 2000, the GSEs enhanced
the disclosure of their interest rate risk: The enter-
prises started publishing scenario-based risk meas-
ures and the duration gap on a monthly basis.
But as Frame and Wall (2002b) point out, the dis-
closure of interest rate risk is not “as comprehen-
sive as would be desirable.”
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DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES
Data Sources
The stock returns are from CRSP®, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of
Business, The University of Chicago, http://crsp.uchicago.edu. The CRSP® data are used with permission,
all rights reserved. The constant-maturity 3-month and 10-year Treasury yields are from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The eurodollar rates are from Bloomberg LP. All data are
published daily. The variables are on a 7-day basis (Friday through Thursday). The observations run
from Friday, May 31, 1991, through Thursday, December 18, 2003. The time period starts when 7-day
eurodollar rates became available.
Definition of the Dependent Variable
Fannie Mae (Freddie Mac) log excess return: sum of daily logarithmic total stock returns of
Fannie Mae (Freddie Mac) from Friday through Thursday, minus the logarithmic return on a 1-week
eurodollar investment undertaken at the beginning of the 7-day investment period (Thursday, close
of business). Total stock return assumes daily reinvestment of dividends and capital gains.
Definition of Explanatory Variables
Market log excess return: sum of daily logarithmic total stock returns of the CRSP® value-weighted
stock market index from Friday through Thursday, minus the logarithmic return on a 1-week euro-
dollar investment undertaken at the beginning of the 7-day investment period (Thursday, close of
business). Total stock return assumes daily reinvestment of dividends and capital gains.
Change of short rate: constant-maturity 3-month Treasury bill yield as of Thursday at close of
business minus the yield observed seven days earlier.
Change of term spread: term spread as of Thursday at close of business minus the spread observed
seven days earlier. The term spread is the difference between the constant-maturity yields of the 10-
year Treasury note and the 3-month Treasury bill.
Time index: distance of the observation in question to the first observation in the studied time
period, measured in number of weeks elapsed, plus 1.
APPENDIX B
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY
I estimate the nonparametric model
(B1) ,
where yt denotes the observation of the dependent variable at time t, the vector zt comprises the obser-
vations of the explanatory variables at time t, and εt is an independently and normally distributed error
term with mean 0 and constant, finite variance σ 2. The dependent variable is the 7-day (Friday through
Thursday) logarithmic excess stock return of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The explanatory variables
comprise the logarithmic excess return of the market, the change of the 3-month T-bill yield, the cor-
responding change of the Treasury term spread, and a time index; all variables are measured over the
yf tt t =+ () z z ε
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10-year T-note and the 3-month T-bill yields. The function f(•) allows for an intercept. The variables
and the data sources are detailed in Appendix A.
I estimate model (B1) using the multivariate smoother LOESS (locally weighted regression) as
developed by Cleveland and Devlin (1988) and Cleveland, Devlin, and Grosse (1988). LOESS estimates
the functional form in each observation by defining a neighborhood comprising the fraction g of the
data points in the population; this fraction of data points is called the smoothing parameter. The data
points to be included in the neighborhood are selected and weighted based on their respective Euclidean
distance to the observation in question. I employ a tri-cube weight function, as detailed in Cleveland
and Devlin.
LOESS smoothes the vector of observations of the dependent variable vector, y, on the matrix of
observations of the explanatory variables, Z. The resulting smoother matrix, S, establishes a linear
relationship between y and the estimate y ˆ:
(B2) .
A restricted version of regression model (B1) is the generalized additive model
(B3) ,
where xt comprises market log excess return and the time index and z ˜t comprises all explanatory vari-
ables included in zt as defined in equation (B1), except for the market log excess return. Both f1(•) and
f2(•) provide for an intercept.
I estimate model (B3) using the backfitting algorithm suggested by Hastie and Tibshirani (1986)
(see also Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990). Backfitting consists of alternating the steps
(B4a)
(B4b) ,
where m ≥ 1 indicates the stage of the iteration procedure and S1 and S2 are the corresponding LOESS
smoother matrices for the partial influences of X and Z, respectively. I start out by smoothing y on X
(and a vector of ones). The smoothing delivers fitted values for y, f1
(0). I subtract f1
(0) from y and smooth
this difference on Z ˜ (which includes a vector of ones), resulting in f2
(1). I keep alternating the steps (B4a,b)
until the vectors of fitted values, f1
(m) and f2
(m), stop changing. For the smoother matrix, I can write
(B5) ,
where I is the identity matrix (see Hastie and Tibshirani, 1986, p. 120).
Following Cleveland and Devlin (1988), the F-statistic for testing the statistical significance of the
restriction that model (B3) imposes on model (B1)—under the assumptions of normality and the unre-
stricted model (B1) offering an unbiased estimate of the dependent variable—reads
(B6) ,
where RL ; (I – L) · (I – L)′, RS ; (I – S) · (I – S)′, ν1 = tr(RL – RS), and δ1 = trRS. The test statistic F ˆ is
approximated by an F-distribution with ν1
2/ν2 numerator and δ1
2/δ2 denominator degrees of freedom,
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 47I use the M-plot method to determine the optimal smoothing parameter, g. M-plots, which were
suggested by Cleveland and Devlin (1988), offer a graphical portrayal of the tradeoff between the con-
tributions of variance and bias to the mean squared error as the smoothing parameter changes. The
expected mean squared error summed over all observations and normalized by the variance, σ 2, reads
(B7) ,
where the subscript g indicates the chosen smoothing parameter. For a sufficiently small smoothing
parameter—let us say f—the bias of the vector of the fitted values, y ˆ, is negligible, resulting in a nearly






g is the contribution of bias to the estimated mean squared error, and Vg is the contribution of variance.
Cleveland and Devlin show that M ˆ
g can be implemented as
(B9) ,
where y′Rfy is the residual sum of squares when the smoothing parameter is f. Because there is an
approximate F-distribution for F ˆ, as mentioned, one can derive a probability distribution for M ˆ
g.
Cleveland and Devlin argue that the smoothing parameter f, for which the bias of the fitted values is
negligible, is “usually in the range of .2 to .4”; I chose f = 0.3.
The M-plots (not shown) indicate that the largest smoothing parameter for which model (B1) delivers
unbiased estimates is g = 0.5 for Fannie Mae and g = 0.35 for Freddie Mac. An analysis of variance does
not reject the generalized additive model (B3); hence, (B3) is the model of choice.
The regression results for the generalized additive model exhibited in Figures 2 and 3 rest on cross-
validated smoothing parameters; I use (delete-one) cross-validation, as discussed in Li (1987) and
Andrews (1991).
In cross-validation, the following loss function—the cross-validation sum of squares—is minimized
(Andrews, 1991):
(B10) ,
where T is the number of observations. The matrix S ˜  results from the smoother matrix S by setting the
principal diagonal elements of S equal to zero. The cross-validated smoothing parameters for the gen-
eralized additive model (B3) read g = 0.8 for Fannie Mae and g = 1 for Freddie Mac.
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